CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE-STATUTE
PROHIBITING DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEES REFUSING TO WORK
ON THEIR SABBATH VIOLATIVE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT-

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
The establishment clause of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ."' Thomas

Jefferson characterized this clause as erecting a "wall of separation between church and State." '2 United States Supreme Court
decisions, however, indicate that this barrier is more ambiguous
than Jefferson's metaphor would imply. In the recent case of
I U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment also provides that "Congress
shall make no law . . .prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .. " Id. For a
recent discussion of the free exercise clause, see Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S.
Ct. 1310 (1986) (United States Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress not
violative of free exercise clause). See also infra note 63 (discussing interaction between free exercise clause and establishment clause).
2 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association
(Jan. 1, 1802) (discussing need for wall of separation between church and state),
reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (1943).
GENTLEMEN: The affectionate sentiments of esteem and approbation
which you are so good as to express towards me, on behalf of the Danbury Baptist Association, give me the highest satisfaction. My duties
dictate a faithful and zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents,
and in proportion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those duties,
the discharge of them becomes more and more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the
nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction that progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to
his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing of
the common Father and Creator of man, and tender you for yourselves
and your religious association, assurances of my high respect and
esteem.
Id.; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
3 See, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Judicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a
'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.").
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Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,' the Court sought to define further the parameters of the church-state relationship under the
establishment clause.
When Donald Thornton, a Presbyterian, began work as a department manager in one of Caldor's Connecticut stores in 1975,
his status as a Sunday Sabbatarian did not conflict with the
store's hours of operation. 6 In 1976, however, the Connecticut
Legislature revised the Sunday closing laws to permit certain
businesses to remain open.7 Thereafter, Caldor expanded its
business hours to include Sundays. 8 As a result of the increased
hours of operation, Caldor required department managers to
work on several Sundays each month. 9 Thornton initially complied with th- policy and began working on Sundays. 0 In November 1979, after working thirty-one Sundays, Thornton
informed Caldor that he would no longer work on Sundays due
to his observance of that day as his Sabbath."' Thornton justified
his refusal to work on Sunday by relying on a Connecticut statute, § 53-303e(b), 2 which provides: "No person who states that
a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be
required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's
4 105 S.Ct. 2914 (1985).
5 See id. at 2917-18.
6

Id. at 2915.

7 Id. at 2915 n.2.

8 Id. at 2915-16. The original statute precluding Sunday hours, CONN. GEN.
§§ 53-300 to -305 (1958), was deemed unconstitutional in State v.
Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A.2d 244 (Conn. C.P. 1976). Several attempts at modifying the statutes to pass constitutional muster proved equally unsuccessful. See Estate of Thornton, 105 S.Ct. at 2915 n.2.
9 Id. at 2916. Thornton was required to work "every third or fourth Sunday."
Id.
10 Id.
I IId.
12 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(b) (West 1985). Section 53-303(e) states,
in its entirety, that
(a) No employer shall compel any employee engaged in any commercial occupation or in the work of any industrial process to work
more than six days in any calendar week. An employee's refusal to work
more than six days in any calendar week shall not constitute grounds for
his dismissal.
(b) No person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such
day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute
grounds for his dismissal.
(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation
of subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the
state board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the
employee was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may
STAT. ANN.
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refusal to work 3 on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for
his dismissal."'1

Thornton subsequently met with Caldor executives in an effort to resolve the conflict between the store's hours of operation
and his religious beliefs. 4 Management offered him the option
of transferring to a managerial position in a Massachusetts store
which was closed on Sunday or remaining at the Connecticut
store in a nonsupervisory position. 5 Unwilling to endure the
hardships involved in relocating to Massachusetts or to suffer the
substantial wage reduction associated with relinquishment of his
managerial position, Thornton rejected both alternatives.' 6 He
was nevertheless transferred to a nonsupervisory position in the
Connecticut store. Thereafter, Thornton resigned his position.17
In May of 1980, Thornton filed a grievance with the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (the Board)
against Caldor claiming wrongful discharge under § 53303e(b)." 8 In response, Caldor contended that the statute was
inapplicable since Thornton had voluntarily resigned from the
company and was therefore not discharged.' 9 Caldor also asserted that the statute violated the establishment clause 20 of the
order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not
limited to reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be
fined not more than two hundred dollars.
Id.
13 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53303e(b) (West 1985)).
14 Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 338, 464 A.2d 785, 788 (1983), aff'd
sub nom. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985). Under the
collective bargaining agreement between Caldor and its employees, nonsupervisory
employees did not have to work on Sundays if it was against their personal religious
convictions. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916 n.4.
15 Caldor, 191 Conn. at 338, 464 A.2d at 788.
16 Id.
17

Id.

18 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916. Thornton relied on § 53-303e(c) which
states that:
Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of [§ 53303e] may appeal such discharge to the state board of mediation and
arbitration. If said board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of [§ 53-303e], it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to reinstatement to his former
or a comparable position.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-303e(c) (West 1985).
19 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916.
20 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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first amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
VI 2 ' of the Connecticut Constitution.22
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board concluded that,
as a quasi-judicial body, it was precluded from adjudicating the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 23 The Board then focused its inquiry on the sincerity of Thornton's religious beliefs
and whether he had been discharged within the meaning of the
statute.2 4 It concluded that Thornton's religious convictions
were sincere and that he had in fact been unlawfully
discharged.2 5
Caldor then appealed to the Superior Court of Connecticut
alleging that the Board exceeded its power and that the statute
was violative of the establishment clause.2 6 The superior court
27
rejected Caldor's assertions and affirmed the Board's decision.
Thereafter, Caldor appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, again challenging the constitutionality of the statute under
the establishment clause.28 In the alternative, Caldor contended
that both the Board and the superior court had erred in finding
that Thornton had been discharged within the meaning of the
statute.29
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Board's refusal to adjudicate the constitutionality of the statute reasoning
21 CONN. CONST. art.

VII provides:

It being the right of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the
Great Creator and Preserver of the Universe, and to render that worship
in a mode consistent with the dictates of their consciences, no person
shall by law be compelled to join or support, nor be classed or associated with, any congregation, church or religious association. No preference shall be given by law to any religious society or denomination in
the state. Each shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers, rights
and privileges, and may support and maintain the ministers or teachers
of its society or denomination, and may build and repair houses for public worship.
Id.

Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916.
Id. at 2917 n.5. Unable to pass on the constitutionality of the statute, the
Board concluded that the enactment was constitutional "until a court decided
otherwise." Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 339, 464 A.2d 785, 788, aff'd
sub nom. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
24 See Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2916.
25 Id. at 2916-17.
26 Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339-40, 464 A.2d at 788-89.
27 Id. at 339, 464 A.2d at 789.
28 Id. at 339-40, 464 A.2d at 789. Donald Thornton died before the Connecticut
Supreme Court adjudicated the merits of his claim. Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at
2915 n.1. The administrator of his estate, nevertheless, continued the suit. Id.
29 Caldor, 191 Conn. at 339-40, 464 A.2d at 789.
22

23
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that such a determination would violate the separation of powers

3
doctrine.3 0 In analyzing the constitutionality of § 53-303e(b), 1

the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied the three-pronged
test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.32 Accordingly, the court concluded that the challenged
Connecticut statute lacked a secular purpose,33 had the primary
effect of advancing religion,34 and fostered excessive government
entanglement with religion. 5 Consequently, the court held that
the statute was clearly "the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' which creates excessive
30 Id. at 340-42, 464 A.2d at 789-91. For a comprehensive discussion of the
separation of powers doctrine, see W. BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL
POWERS (1967).
31 See Caldor, 191 Conn. at 345-51, 464 A.2d at 792-94. The Connecticut
Supreme Court chose not to analyze the constitutionality of the statute under article VII of the Connecticut Constitution. Estate of Thornton, 105 S.Ct. at 2917 n.6.
32 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court analyzed a Pennsylvania statute that
permitted state subsidization of educational costs for specified secular courses in
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, and a Rhode Island statute authorizing the state to pay 15% of teachers' salaries in nonpublic elementary schools. Id.
at 606-07. In deeming both statutes unconstitutional, the Court delineated a tripartite test for analysis under the establishment clause. See id. at 612-13. The
Court stated "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' " Id. (citations omitted).
33 Caldor, 191 Conn. at 347-49, 464 A.2d at 792-93. The court noted that a valid
secular purpose would be the protection of " 'all persons from the physical and
moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor.'" Id. at 347, 464 A.2d
at 792 (quoting Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1884)). The court reasoned, however, that the accomplishment of this goal by allowing the employee to
designate any day as his Sabbath was not adequately devoid of religious overtones.
Id. at 347, 464 A.2d at 792.
The court also distinguished McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In
McGowan, religious and nonreligious employees had been equally benefitted by
Maryland's Sunday closing law, whereas in Estate of Thornton only those employees
claiming observance of the Sabbath could invoke statutory protection. Caldor, 191
Conn. at 349, 464 A.2d at 793.
34 Caldor, 191 Conn. at 349-50, 464 A.2d at 793-94. The Court noted that § 53303e confers a "benefit" exclusively on a religious basis. Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at
794. Moreover, the court reasoned that employees who do not observe a Sabbath
may not take advantage of the statute's benefits. Id. Therefore, the "inescapable
conclusion is that § 53-303e(b) possesses the primary effect of advancing religion."
Id.
35 Id. at 350-51, 464 A.2d at 794. The court noted that the Board would be
called upon to analyze particular religious practices and their scope, as well as
which activities constituted observance of the Sabbath. Accordingly, the court concluded that such activities involved excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Id.
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governmental entanglements between church and state." 36
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
in March 1984.7 The Court affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Connecticut and reasoned that the challenged
statute was unconstitutional because its primary effect impermissibly advanced religious practices. s 8
The United States Supreme Court's analytical framework for
reviewing cases involving establishment clause issues developed
over a relatively short period of time. Indeed, it was not until
1940 that the Court held the clause applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.3 9 Six years later, the Court
decided Everson v. Board of Education,40 a landmark case in contemporary establishment clause analysis.41
In Everson, a New Jersey statute authorized local school districts to promulgate rules and negotiate contracts regarding the
transportation of children to and from parochial schools. 4 2 The
statute also authorized state reimbursement of the transportation
costs to parents of private school children.43 Although noting
that the "wall of separation" between church and state "must be
36 Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619
(1971)).
37 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
38 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918.
39 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in [the fourteenth amendment] embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.") (footnote omitted).
40 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
41 See id. at 15-16. In attempting to define the boundaries of the clause, the
Court stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
Id.
42 Id. at 3.
43 Id. at 5.
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kept high and impregnable," 44 the Court upheld the reimbursement scheme. 45 According to the Everson Court, the first amendment required states to be neutral with regard to religion. 46 The
Court reasoned, however, that the challenged legislation met the
requirement of impartiality because it provided a general program aimed at aiding parents, irrespective of their religious beliefs, in safely transporting their children to school.4 7
The Court was guided by the general principles of Everson
until 1963, when it reformulated the criteria applicable to establishment clause cases.4 8 In School District v. Shempp, 4 9 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that required the reading of the Holy Bible at the start of each school
day. 50 The statute also provided that any child could be excused
from the exercise upon the formal request of the child's parent
or guardian. 5 ' In deeming the enactments unconstitutional, the
Shempp Court articulated a two-prong test. 52 In their view, a challenged enactment must have "a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion" in order to withstand the strictures of the establishment clause.53
Reasoning that the challenged enactment lacked a secular purpose, the Shempp Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional.54
Similarly, Walz v. Tax Commission, involved a challenge to a
New York statute that provided tax exemptions to properties
44 Id. at 18.
45 Id.
46

Id.

47 Id. The Everson Court further analogized the state subsidized transportation

scheme to other governmental services provided to churches. Id. at 17. The Court
reasoned that parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend schools
that the state had terminated from general government services such as ordinary
police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways, and
sidewalks. Of course, depriving church schools of these services, which are separate and indisputably marked off from the religious function, would make it far
more difficult for the schools to operate. In the Court's view, however, this is not
the purpose of the first amendment. Id. at 17-18.
48 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) [hereinafter Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp].
49 See id.
50 Id. at 205. The Court also examined the validity of a Maryland statute that
required children in the Baltimore public school system to begin each school day
with a biblical reading or religious prayer. Id. at 211.
51 Id. at 205.
52 See id. at 222.
53 Id. (citations omitted).
54 Id. at 223-25.
55 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

134

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 17:127

used entirely for religious worship. 6 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer
part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state. There is no genuine nexus
between tax exemption and establishment of religion.

' 57

Ac-

cordingly, the Court ruled that the challenged statute was not
violative of the establishment clause because it did not promote
excessive involvement between church and state.5"
Thereafter, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,59 the Court combined the
criteria articulated in Walz and Shempp and enunciated a tripartite
test to determine whether a statute is violative of the establishment clause.60 In Lemon, the Court addressed the validity of a
Pennsylvania statute authorizing the state to subsidize the cost of
teaching secular courses in nonpublic schools and a Rhode Island statute authorizing the state to subsidize the salaries of
teachers in nonpublic elementary schools.6 1 In determining that
the statutes were unconstitutional, the Lemon Court formulated a
comprehensive method of analyzing constitutional issues under
the establishment clause.62 The Court opined that the establishment clause requires that a challenged statute "must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally,
the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "63
Id. at 666.
Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76. The Court noted: "The exemption creates only a minimum
and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to
complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other."
Id. at 676.
59 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
60 See id. at 612-13.
61 Id. at 606-07.
62 See id. at 612-14; see also supra note 32 for a discussion of the tripartite Lemon
test.
63 Id. (citations omitted). Subsequent cases reveal that a challenged statute or
program will be held violative of the establishment clause if it fails to satisfy any one
of the three-pronged Lemon criteria. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1980) (per curiam) ("If a statute violates any of [the] three [Lemon] principles, it
must be struck down under the Establishment Clause."). The Court, however, has
not consistently applied the Lemon test. Compare Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1982) (strict interpretation of Lemon test) with Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 394 (1983) (Lemon test employed merely as an aid). Part of the inconsistency
in establishment clause interpretations may be attributed to its interaction with the
free exercise of religion clause of the first amendment. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
56
57
58
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In Stone v. Graham,64 the Court evidenced its strong commitment to the tripartite Lemon test.65 Stone involved a 1980 challenge to a Kentucky statute that required a copy of the Ten
Commandments to be displayed in every public school classroom
in the state.66 The statute also provided that the copies were to
be purchased with funds voluntarily contributed to the state.67
Furthermore, each copy was to bear the following legislatively
mandated statement of secular purpose: " 'The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as
the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.' ",68 In a per curiam opinion, the
majority stated that "[t]his Court has announced a three-part test
for determining whether a challenged state statute is permissible
under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. ' 6 9 Relying on the Lemon criteria, the Stone Court concluded
that the statute lacked a secular purpose and was therefore unconstitutional. 71 Moreover, the Court summarily rejected the legislature's articulation of a secular purpose. 1
U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist was discharged by her employer when she refused to work on Saturday. Id. at 399. She was subsequently
denied unemployment compensation by the state of South Carolina. Id. at 400.
The Court held that the state's denial of compensation benefits violated the free
exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. at 409. The Court reasoned that the
state's denial of compensation benefits "forces her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other." Id. at
404; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are
cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would
tend to clash with the other.").
In addition, individual Justices' perceptions of the establishment clause differ
from one another. Compare Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rather than continuing
with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' described in Lemon, I would resurrect the 'high and impregnable' wall
between church and state constructed by the Framers of the First Amendment.")
(citation omitted) with Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("the Establishment Clause is limited 'to government support of
proselytizing activities of religious sects by throwing the weight of' secular
authorit[ies] behind the dissemination of religious tenets' ") (quoting Abington
School Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 314 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
64 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curium).
65 See id. at 40-41.
66 Id. at 39.
(7 Id. at 39 n.l (citing Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.178(3) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980)).
68 Id. (quoting Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.178(2) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980)).
611Id. at 40.
70

Id. at 40-42.

71

Id. at 41. The Court noted: "The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten
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In 1982, the Court reiterated its commitment to the Lemon
test.

72

In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. ,73 the Court considered the

constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the issuance of a liquor license if a church or school within five hundred feet of the proposed licensed premises formally objected. 4
Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Burger recognized that the
goal of the statute-protection of" 'spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associated with liquor outlets' "-constituted a valid secular purpose. 75 The Court opined,
however, that this objective could be adequately obtained
through other means.76 The Court further reasoned that the
statute failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the Lemon
test. 7 7 In the Court's opinion, the statute endowed churches with
substantial power, thereby enmeshing them in the exercise of
legislative functions.78 In addition, the majority accepted the
characterization of the statute as a legislative delegation of a limited "veto power" to religious institutions. 79 According to the
Court, the fact that the same "veto power" had been given to
schools was insignificant for purposes of analysis under the establishment clause. 0 Finally, although the Larkin Court invoked
the "wall of separation" metaphor and labeled it a "useful signpost" in adjudicating establishment clause challenges," the
Court also recognized that "limited and incidental entanglement
between church and state" inevitably occurs in our society.82
Shortly thereafter, the Court's commitment to the Lemon test
began to wane.8" The 1983 case of Mueller v. Allen 8 4 involved a
Minnesota statute that permitted parents of school age children
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature ...and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Id.
72 See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
73 See id.
74 Id. at 117 (citing MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 138, § 16c (West 1974)).
75 Id. at 123 (quoting Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 459 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D.
Mass. 1980), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 662 F.2d 88 (1st Cir.), aff'd in part, 662
F.2d 102 (1981) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. 459 U.S. 116 (1982)).
76 Id. at 123-24.
77 See id. at 125-26.
78
79

Id. at 127.
Id. at 120.

80 Id.

81 Id. at 123 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
82 Id.
83 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also Note, Tax Benefits to Parents
Whose Children Attend Sectarian School Not Violative of the First Amendment, 14 SETON
HALL L. REV. 683, 689 (1984).
84 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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to deduct from their taxable income "certain expenses incurred
in providing for the education of their children." ' 85 Although the
Mueller Court applied the Lemon test, the majority emphasized
that it provided " 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing
with Establishment Clause challenges. 86
Initially, the Court determined that the statute at issue in
Mueller satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test. 87 According to
the Court, the challenged enactment plainly served the secular
purpose of insuring that the state maintain a well-educated populace.88 Moreover, the Mueller Court also noted its "reluctance to
attribute unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly
when a plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be
discerned from the face of the statute." '89 The Court further

noted that the enactment was neutral on its face and allowed the
parents of both public and private school children to claim the
deduction.90 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist also
stressed that the statute conferred benefits directly upon the parents and not the religious schools. 91 Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the second prong of the Lemon test was
satisfied.92 Finally, the Court ruled that state determinations of
what constituted a permissible deduction did not foster an excessive entanglement between church and state. 93 Therefore, the
third prong of the Lemon test was held to be satisfied.94
In dissent, Justice Marshall advocated a stricter interpretation of the establishment clause.9 5 The Justice stated that "[t]he
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a state
from subsidizing religious education whether it does so directly
85 Id. at 390 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09 (West 1982)). Under the statute,
parents of dependent children in grades kindergarten to six could deduct from
their gross income up to $500 per child for the cost of providing tuition, textbooks,
and transportation. Parents of children in grades seven through 12 could deduct
up to $700 per child. The statute further provided that no deduction could be
taken for the cost of "instructional books and materials used in the teaching of
religious tenets, doctrines or worship." Id. at 390 n. 1 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 290.09(22) (West 1982)).
86 Id. at 394 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
87 See id. at 395.
8 Id.
89 Id. at 394-95.
90 Id. at 398.

91 Id. at 399.

Id. at 396-99.
93 Id. at 403.
92

94

Id.

95

See id. at 404-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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or indirectly."' 96 Justice Marshall also asserted that the majority
failed to analyze adequately the effect of the statute.97 While
agreeing that the tax deductions were technically available to all
parents of school age children, Justice Marshall stated that parents of children attending sectarian schools were disproportionately benefited.98 Consequently, the dissent concluded that the
statute had failed to satisfy the "primary effect" prong of the
Lemon test and was thus violative of the establishment clause. 9 9
Within one week after the Mueller decision, the Court undertook an examination of the establishment clause without resorting to the Lemon criteria.100 In Marsh v. Chambers, 1° ' the Court
examined the constitutionality of the Nebraska Legislature's
practice of beginning each of its sessions with a prayer offered by
a publicly paid chaplain. 0 2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger upheld the constitutionality of the chaplaincy practice. '0 3 Initially, the majority relied on historical evidence which
indicated that the drafters of the first amendment did not consider the chaplaincy practice violative of the establishment
clause. 04 The Court noted, for example, that "the men who
wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has
continued without interruption ever since [the] early session[s] of
Congress.' 0 5 Although this historical evidence was admittedly
not dispositive of the issue at hand, the Court stressed that the
chaplaincy practice did not threaten the establishment of religion
0 6
any more than did the statutes upheld in Everson and Wa/z.'
The majority did not employ the Lemon criteria in upholding the
Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 405, 415 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Fewer than 100 of the approximately
900,000 school age children in Minnesota attend public schools which have tuition.
Id. Consequently, Justice Marshall reasoned that the vast majority of those families
cannot take advantage of the statute "except in the unlikely event that they buy
$700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their school-age children." Id.
9.9Id. at 416-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
101 See id.
102 Id. at 784-85. The chaplain was selected biennially by the Executive Board of
the Legislative Council and was paid $319.75 per month. Id. at 785.
1'
See id. at 792-95.
104 Id. at 786-92.
1o5 Id. at 788.
106 Id. at 791.
96
97
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validity of Nebraska's chaplaincy practice.' 0 7 Moreover, the Marsh
Court asserted that "the practice of opening legislative sessions
with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society."'' 0 8 Accordingly, the Court opined that legislative invocation of divine
guidance amounted to nothing more than "a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country."' 0 9
In dissent, Justice Brennan opined that the Marsh Court's
holding was a "narrow" one which "should pose little threat to
the overall fate of the Establishment Clause."" 0 Furthermore,
the Justice stated that the majority's failure to apply the Lemon
test "simply confirms that the Court is carving out an exception
to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment
Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer.""' In Justice Brennan's opinion, the challenged chaplaincy practice would
fail each of the three Lemon criteria, and thus should be deemed
unconstitutional." 12
Later, in Lynch v. Donnelly,' 13 the Court applied the Lemon
test, but stated that it was unwilling "to be confined to any single
test or criterion in this sensitive area."' '14 In Lynch, residents of
the City of Pawtuckett, Rhode Island challenged that city's fortyyear practice of including a creche in its annual Christmas display
as being violative of the establishment clause." 5 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that a celebration of the
holiday season was secular in nature, thus satisfying the first
prong of the Lemon test. 1 6 The Lynch Court next rejected the
argument that the creche impermissibly benefited religion and
concluded that the second prong of the Lemon test was satis107

108

See id. at 784-95.
Id. at 792.

109 Id.
110O Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
III Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 796-801 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the
goal of invoking divine guidance is clearly religious and lacking secular value; the
primary effect of the chaplaincy practice is to officially sponsor a form of religious
worship; and the practice fosters government entanglement with religion because it
necessitates state supervision in the selection of the chaplain and in ensuring that
the chaplain limits himself to suitable prayers. Id. at 797-99 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1

465 U.S. 668 (1984).

Id. at 679. Moreover, the Court stated that the wall of separation "is not a
wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact
exists between church and state." Id. at 673.
115 Id. at 671.
I Id. at 680-81.
114
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Moreover, the Court found the entanglement prong to
be satisfied since the erection and maintenance of the cr&che fostered little, if any, interaction between church and state." 8 In its
holding, the Court reiterated much of the same historical evidence presented in Marsh." 9 In permitting the city to erect the
creche, the Court indicated that the establishment clause could
be interpreted as allowing a greater level of interaction between
1 20
government and religion than prior decisions would indicate.
Justice Brennan dissented and stated that the Court's return
to the Lemon mode of analysis proved that Marsh had been an
aberrant departure from the Court's settled method of analyzing
establishment clause cases.' 2 ' He asserted, however, that "the
Court's less than vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests
that its commitment to those standards may only be
22
fled.

superficial."

In the 1985 case of Wallace v. Jaffree,' 23 the Court considered
the constitutionality of an Alabama statute that authorized public
schools to begin each day with a one minute period of silence
"for meditation and voluntary prayer."'' 24 The Court held that
the statute violated the establishment clause because it lacked a
secular purpose. 25 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
opined that "[n]o consideration of the second or third criteria [of
Lemon] is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular
17 Id. at 681-83.

118 Id. at 683-84. The Court further reasoned that:
There is no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the
content or design of the exhibit prior to or since Pawtucket's purchase
of the creche. No expenditures for the maintenance of the creche have
been necessary; and since the city owns the creche, now valued at $200,
the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. In many respects the
display requires far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church
and state than religious paintings in public galleries.
Id. at 684.
119 See id. at 675-78.
120 Id. at 678. The Lynch Court noted:
In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule
can be framed. The Establishment Clause like the Due Process Clause is
not a precise, detailed provision in a legal code capable of ready application. The line between permissible relationships and those barred by
the Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due process
can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test.
Id. at 678-79.
i21 Id. at 695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
i22 Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985)
124 Id. at 2481 (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
125 Id. at 2490.
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purpose."' 2 6 Accordingly, the Wallace Court concluded that the
legislature "was not motivated by any clear secular purpose-indeed, the statute has no secular purpose." 127
As prior law reflects, the Court's position with regard to the
establishment clause and the tripartite Lemon test has vacillated.
Estate of Thornton marks the Supreme Court's most recent attempt
to define the parameters of the establishment clause.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Estate of Thornton majority,128 initially noted that the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration's construction of § 53-303e(b) was binding
on the federal courts. 2 9 The Board construed the statute as conferring an absolute right upon employees to designate any day of
the week as their Sabbath. 30 The Estate of Thornton majority,
however, found this absolute right of the Sabbatarian over secular concerns to be highly objectionable.' 3 ' Equally objectionable,
according to the Court, was the fact that the statute did not provide for "special circumstances" occurring in the ordinary course
of employment. 3 2 The ChiefJustice reasoned that an individual
employed on a Monday through Friday basis may designate any
of those days as his Sabbath and could not be terminated for refusing to work on that day.' 3 3 Accordingly, the employer would
have to adjust his affairs to accommodate fully the employee's
desire regardless of the severity of the economic con13
sequences.
The Court also addressed the challenged statute's effect on
non-religious employees required to replace the Sabbath observer. 135 According to the Court, the challenged statute resulted in non-religious employees who have earned the valuable
right to have a weekend day off through seniority "be[ing] forced
to surrender this privilege to the Sabbath observer: years of service and payment of 'dues' at the workplace simply cannot comId.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2918. Justice O'Connor, joined by justice
Marshall, filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice Rehnquist dissented, but did not
write an opinion. Id.
129 Id. at 2917-18 n.8 (citations omitted).
130 Id. (citations omitted).
131 Id. at 2918.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. The Court also noted that the employer was without recourse if a high
percentage of his workforce asserted their right to the same Sabbath. Id.
135 Id. at 2918 n.9.
126
127
128
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pete with the sabbath observer's absolute right under the
statute."' 6 Similarly, employees seeking a weekend day off, in
order to spend time with their spouses, are forced to take a "back
seat" to the religious observer. 3 7 Consequently, the Court concluded that the challenged statute's "unyielding weighting" in
favor of the religious employee's interest "impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious practice."'' 8 Therefore, the Court
determined that the Connecticut statute was unconstitutional because it "provid[ed] Sabbath observers with an 39absolute and un'
qualified right not to work on their Sabbath."'
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she
agreed with the majority that the effect of § 53-303e(b) impermissibly advanced religion. 40 In her view, the statute endorsed
Sabbath observances to the detriment of other employees who
do not share such beliefs.' 4 ' According to Justice O'Connor,
§ 53-303e(b) confered "special" and "absolute" protection on its
beneficiaries without accommodating the religious observances
of other employees. 42 Consequently, Justice O'Connor concluded that § 53-303e(b) had the effect of advancing religion,
43
and was therefore violative of the establishment clause.
Directing her attention to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Acts,' 44 Justice O'Connor further reasoned that the Court's anal136

Id.

137 Id.
138

Id.

139 Id.

See id. at 2918-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
143 Id.
144 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j) & 2000e-2 (1982)). The term religion is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) as:
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business.
Id. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) specifies unlawful employment practices to
include:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in140
141
142
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ysis would not invalidate those statutes. 4 5 Although Title VII
also requires that private employers accommodate their employees' religious practices, Justice O'Connor noted that the employer may be excused from compliance when it "would cause
undue hardship to the employer's business."' 146 Consequently,
unlike the Connecticut statute, Title VII's mandates are not absolute. 14 7 Justice O'Connor also posited that the provisions of Title
VII manifest a secular purpose because they are directed toward
antidiscrimination and "assuring employment opportunity to all
groups in our pluralistic society" rather than endorsing particular religious practices.14 8 Justice O'Connor thus concluded that
Title VII would survive the majority's analysis since its requirements extend to all religious beliefs and not just the observance
49
of the Sabbath.'
As stated earlier, the Court's position with regard to the establishment clause has fluctuated greatly. These vacillations have
made attempts at predicting the future direction of the Court
with respect to the establishment clause both difficult and highly
speculative. A careful analysis of the Court's decision in Estate of
Thornton in conjunction with its immediate predecessors, however, reduces the confusion produced by the seemingly contrary
decisions and clarifies the Court's approach to establishment
clause challenges.
Prior adjudications of the establishment clause can be divided into three categories: those in which the Court strictly interpreted the tripartite Lemon criteria, thereby yielding a
restrictive view of the establishment clause; those in which the
tripartite test was either not applied, or was applied in such a way
as to advocate a substantially more permissive view of the establishment clause; and those in which the Court used the Lemon criteria primarily as an aid in the balancing of relevant factors, thus
injecting flexibility into the process of interpreting the establishment clause.
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id.
145 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(l)).
Id.; see also Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (state statute authorizing
period of meditation in public schools held violative of establishment clause).
148 Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149 Id. (emphasis added).
146

147
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Stone,' 50 Larkin, 15' and Wallace' 5 2 fall within the first category.
Each of these cases involved a form of state action which has traditionally been subjected to a strict application of the establishment clause. For example, both Stone and Wallace centered
around a legislative attempt to inject religion into the public
school system. 5 3 Traditionally, the Court has been more willing
to erect a high wall between church and state in such cases.' 5 4
Similarly, Larkin involved a statute which the Court characterized
as a delegation of legislative power to religious organizations. 155
Furthermore, the nature of these cases eliminated the need for
the Court to justify its strict interpretation of the establishment
clause with the strictures of the free exercise clause. 56 The
Court's strict interpretation of the establishment clause in these
cases can thus be viewed as aberrational because such an interpretation will only be employed in a very specific type of establishment clause challenge.
Marsh 5 7 and Lynch' 58 fall within the second category. These
cases reflect the Court's unwillingness to strike down what it considers to be harmless traditions and customs, although they may
well be held unconstitutional if subjected to more rigorous scrutiny. As a result, these cases are examples of instances in which
the Court's decision is based more upon the personal preferences of the justices than upon legal principles. 59 Therefore,
the Court's interpretations of the establishment clause in these
cases can also be viewed as aberrational.
150 See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stone.
151 See supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of Larkin.
152 See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wallace.
153 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2481 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 39 (1980) (per curiam).
154 See, e.g., Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Casefor a Return to the Strict Interpretationof
the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1464 (1981). The author noted
that "[i]n recognizing establishment clause restrictions on religious activity in public schools, Supreme Court decisions have been remarkably harmonious. The majority opinions in these cases asserted the requirement of government neutrality
toward religion in nearly absolute terms ..
" Id.
155 See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
156 In Larkin, for example, it could not be asserted that the free exercise clause
required the state to delegate legislative power to churches. Similarly, it could not
be asserted in Stone or Wallace that the free exercise clause required the state to
inject religion into public schools. See generally supra note 63 (discussing interaction
between establishment clause and free exercise clause).
157 See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of Marsh.
158 See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lynch.
159 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (implying Court had viewed Nebraska's chaplaincy practice through "sentimental
eyes").
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Everson, 160 Mueller, 16 ' and other cases involving aid to sectar-

ian schools 16 2 fall within the third category and are representative of the bulk of establishment clause cases heard by the Court.
Cases falling within this category have produced the most confusion. 1 63 Consequently, an understanding of the implications of
the method of analysis employed in Estate of Thornton provides
helpful guidance in understanding the vast majority of prior establishment clause cases and in predicting the Court's future position regarding the establishment clause.
In reviewing § 53-303e(b), the Estate of Thornton Court applied only the effects prong of the Lemon test, despite the
Supreme Court of Connecticut's persuasive demonstration that
the statute failed to satisfy all three prongs of the test. 164 By ignoring both the purpose and governmental entanglement prongs
of the Lemon criteria, the Court suggests that the effect of a challenged statute will be of primary importance in the adjudication
of establishment clause cases.
In finding the absolutism of the Connecticut statute objectionable, the Court implied that a narrowly tailored statute sensitive to the needs of both employees and employers would pass
constitutional muster. 6 5 Thus, Estate of Thornton indicates that
the Court is using the Lemon criteria as a basis for undertaking a
balancing approach in establishment clause analysis rather than
applying inflexible rules.
Under this approach, the Court does not erect a wall between church and state which would effectively prevent any benefit to flow from government toward religion. Rather, the
strictures of the establishment clause are satisfied when benefits
and burdens are equally proportioned between the sectarian and
secular segments of society. The utilization of this balancing
technique provides the Court with flexibility in interpreting the
See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of Everson.
See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mueller.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see also Note, supra note 83, at
689.
163 See, e.g., Note, supra note 154, at 1464 ("In contrast to its firm stance against
religious activity in public schools, the Supreme Court's approach to constitutional
restrictions on government aid to sectarian schools had been ambiguous and
untidy.").
164 See Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2917.
165 See id. at 2918. In addition,Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, opined that
the majority's analysis would not invalidate title VII of the Civil Rights Acts, which
only requires employers to "reasonably accommodate" their employee's religious
habits. Id. at 2919 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160
161
162
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establishment clause. One reason for the need for flexibility is
the tension that exists between the two religion clauses. In short,
the courts must contend with the fact that broad interpretations
66
of both religion clauses will result in friction between the two. ,

It must be noted, however, that the utilization of flexibility has
not led to a reduction of this tension. 167
Estate of Thornton demonstrates that the Court is not willing
to relinquish this flexibility. Accordingly, in the vast majority of
establishment clause cases, the Court will undertake a balancing
approach in which any state aid to religion will be weighed
against secular considerations. The utilization of such a balancing approach is not per se objectionable. This analytical framework becomes suspect, however, when it is employed to advance
the personal prejudices of the judges forced to confront establishment clause issues. It is, therefore, imperative that courts apply this balancing test objectively and carefully examine the
relevant secular and sectarian considerations. Moreover, courts
166 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). In Walz, the Court
discussed the relationship between the establishment and free exercise clauses of
the first amendment:
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution.
The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may
have been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to
write a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion
Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in
retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these
clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have
limited meaning as general principles.
The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other.
Id.
167 See supra note 63 for a discussion of the interaction between religion clauses;
compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment compensation based upon an individual's refusal to work on Sabbath held to be violative of
the free exercise clause) with Estate of Thornton, 105 S. Ct. at 2914 (statute prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee based upon employee's refusal to
work on Sabbath held violative of establishment clause). Arguably, a statute
designed to implement the Sherbert decision could be held to be violative of the
establishment clause under the Estate of Thornton rationale. For example, the statute
might require that the state pay unemployment benefits to those who have been
discharged because of their refusal to work on their Sabbath. Under Estate of Thornton, the statute would be deemed to be a violation of the establishment clause since
it disadvantages those who have been discharged because they refused to work on a
weekend day for legitimate, yet nonreligious reasons.
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applying this test should set forth these considerations in detail,
thereby reducing the possibility that these issues will be viewed
through sentimental eyes.
Dominick Bratti

